Abstract. Keyword search on encrypted data enables one to search keyword ciphertexts without compromising keyword security. We further investigate this problem and propose a novel variant, dubbed certificateless keyword search on encrypted data (CLKS). CLKS not only supports keyword search on encrypted data, but also brings promising features due to the certificateless cryptography. In contrast to the certificated-based keyword search, CLKS requires no validation on the trustworthy of the public key before encrypting keywords; in contrast to the identity-based keyword search, CLKS prevents the key issuer (e.g., key generator center) from penetrating any information on keyword ciphertexts by leveraging the capability of accessing all data users' (partial) private keys. Specifically, we rigorously define the syntax and security definitions for CLKS, and present the construction that is provably secure in the standard model under the Decisional Linear assumption. We implemented the proposed CLKS scheme and evaluated its performance. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to integrate certificateless cryptography with keyword search on encrypted data.
Introduction
Cloud computing enables data owners to outsource their data to the cloud at affordable price and access/share the outsourced data with other users. The outsourcing, however, separates the data ownership and its (physical) storage ownership and brings the security concern [18, 20, 33] such as data privacy. Though it is natural for data owners to encrypt their own data before outsourcing, the encryption operation makes some useful functions, such as keyword search, become infeasible. Fortunately, the subject of keyword search on encrypted data has been extensively studied and a large number of solutions have been proposed. Roughly speaking, keyword search on encrypted data can be divided into three categories according to the key distribution/generation setting: symmetric key based keyword search, certificate-based keyword search 1 and identity-based (or attribute-based) keyword search 2 . Comparing with symmetric key based keyword search, the last two kinds of keyword search are more flexible and promising because they do not require any key sharing between the data owner and the target user who the data will be shared with.
For certificate-based keyword search, when the data owner wants to share the data with a target user, he will encrypt the data with the target user's public key. Note that before this operation, the data owner needs to validate the certificate which binds the target user's identity and the corresponding public key in order to assure that the public key is really associated with the target user, which needs to rely on some trust/certificate management system such as PKI. In addition, the data owner might need to conduct costly certificate chain verification (until finding a certificate authority he trusts) for certificate validation. In order to mitigate this downside, identity-based (attribute-based) keyword search [31, 34, 28] is introduced where the public key is exactly the same as the target user's identity (attributes) and therefore there is no need to validate the correctness of the public key. Despite its benefits, identity-based (attribute-based) keyword search suffers from the key escrow problem that the key generation authority has full access to all data users' private keys. Contribution. We propose certificateless keyword search on encrypted data (CLKS), which preserves the merits of identity-based keyword search (e.g., no certificate management and validation) without inherent key escrow problem. To be specific, we follow the basic principle underlying the certificateless cryptography: treating the user's identity as part of the public key and letting the user' private key consisting of two components, one generated by the key generation center and the other chosen by the user. Thus, CLKS allows users to put less trust on the key generation center. We summarize our contribution as follows and compare three kinds of keyword search solutions in Table 1: -We first integrate the certificateless cryptography with keyword search on encrypted data. We formalize the notion for CLKS, and rigorously define its security properties. -We present a CLKS scheme that is provably secure in the standard model under the Decisional Linear assumption. Similar to other certificateless primitives, the proposed certificateless keyword search scheme leverages the identity as user's partial public key and eliminates the key escrow problem. We implemented the proposed scheme and conducted the performance evaluation on real data to show its feasibility.
Organization. Section 2 describes the related work. Section 3 presents cryptographic assumptions and primitives. Section 4 presents the system and threat Third party authority Fully trusted third party authority Certificateless (our paper) User and third party authority Honest-but-curious third party authority model, and Section 5 formalizes the syntax and security definitions. Section 6 presents the main construction Section 7 presents the performance.
Related Work
We briefly review the relevant techniques on keyword search on encrypted data, which are separated into three categories as follows: Symmetric key based keyword search. It allows the data owner to encrypt keywords and the corresponding data, and outsource keyword ciphertexts and data ciphertexts to the remote server. Only the data owner, or someone with the symmetric key, can generate the search token in order to ask the cloud to conduct search on keyword ciphertexts. [27] proposed the first symmetric key based keyword search scheme. Many variants, e.g., [17, 12, 14, 22, 23, 11, 8] have been proposed with various features, for example, improved security [14] , dynamic support [22] , UC security [23] , verifiability [11] and multi-user sharing [21] . The main advantage of the symmetric key based keyword search is its high efficiency since it does not involve any costly public key operations (e.g. exponentiation, pairing). In the data sharing scenario, however, the technique requires the data owner and the target user (or remote server) sharing some common secret [21] . Certificate-based keyword search. For certificate-based keyword search, the data owner encrypts keywords and data with the public key of the target user, so that the target user can use his own private key to generate the search token and then conduct the search on keyword ciphertexts. Many solutions, e.g., [5, 4, 7, 1, 9, 10, 30, 26, 29] , have been proposed after [6] initiated the first study. While certificate-based keyword search is more flexible compared with symmetric key based keyword search, it requires the data owner validating the target user's public key before encrypting keywords. The trust and certificate management infrastructure, e.g., PKI, has been introduced to facilitate the validation process. Identity-based (attribute-based) keyword search. For identity-based (attributebased) keyword search, the data owner encrypts the keyword and data with the target user's identity (or attributes in attribute-based keyword search). The target user, after acquiring the private key from the key generation authority, can generate the search token and then conduct search on keyword ciphertexts. [31] presented the first identity-based keyword search scheme and [34, 28] independently introduced the attribute-based keyword search. In this setting, data owner does not need to validate whether the used public key is associated with the target user or not, since the public key is exactly the same as the user's identity or attributes. While it mitigates the certificate management issue, it indeed introduces another issue -key escrow problem, since the key generation authority can access all users' private keys.
Preliminaries
Let x R ← X denote selecting an element x from the set X uniformly at random. Let I be the user universe where each user is associated to a unique identity id.
Let (e, p, g, G, G T ) ← BMP(1 ℓ ) be the function that generates a bilinear map e : G × G → G T by taking as input a security parameter ℓ, such that p is an ℓ-bit prime, G and G T are two cyclic groups of prime order p and g is a random generator of group G. The bilinear map e should satisfy (i) ∀a,
(ii) e(g, g) = 1 and (iii) e can be computed efficiently. We assume that the identities are distinct n-bit numbers. Let
where H 1 is a function mapping id to an element in G (defined as in section 6) and H 2 is modeled as a collision-resistant hash function.
p are unknown, the DL assumption states that any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A can determine whether Q = f r1+r2 or not at most with a negligible advantage with respect to the security parameter ℓ, where the "advantage" is defined as
System and Threat Model
System model We consider the system model as shown in Figure 1 , consisting of three entities: the key generation center KGC issuing partial private keys to data users, the cloud server providing storage and search services, and data users (i.e., data owner and target users). The data owner encrypts his data (data files and keywords that index the data files) with the target user's public key (note that the target user can be either himself or the user who the data will be shared with). The data owner outsources to the cloud keyword ciphertexts, data file ciphertexts and the mappings between the keyword ciphertexts and data file ciphertexts (given a keyword ciphertext, the mapping can be used to find the relevant data file ciphertexts). With his own private key, the target user can generate a search token, which is sent to the cloud, so that the cloud can conduct keyword search on the keyword ciphertexts and return the corresponding data file ciphertexts. Since the data files can be encrypted by with hybrid encryption with various public key encryption, e.g., certificateless encryption [2] and certificateless proxy re-encryption [32] , for simplicity, in the rest of paper we only consider how to encrypt keywords in the certificateless setting. We also assume that there exists a proper authentication protocol allowing KGC to authenticate the users' identities when issuing the partial private keys.
Application example. For illustrating the model visually, we consider the application of sharing Electronic Health Record (EHRs): The health service vendor (e.g., software infrastructure) acts as key generation center, and patients can be the data owners of EHRs, and will share EHRs with professionals for treatment purpose. When the user (either patients or professionals) registers the system, he will be assigned with a partial private key with respect to his unique identity and can generate the private/public key. To share EHRs with a professional, the patient can use that professional's public key (requiring no validation of the public key) to encrypt the indexed keywords (e.g. age, name, DOB etc.) and store the encrypted keywords and the associated encrypted EHRs in the storage system. The professional then generates the tokens based on keywords together with his own private key, and asks the storage system to return the encrypted EHRs having matched keywords. We can see that the benefit is that the vendor cannot leverage its knowledge on partial private keys to learn extra information from the encrypted index, and the patients require no validation on public key. Threat model Similar to the threat model in the certificateless setting, we assume that the KGC cannot be fully trusted. That is, the KGC follows the protocol specification honestly but might attempt to use the information he obtained to penetrate more information. We assume that the users might be malicious, meaning that the users might pretend to be some target user and distribute the fake public key (i.e., the public key is different from that published by the target user) on behalf of the target user in order to learn information about the target user's ciphertexts. We assume that the cloud server is honestbut-curious, meaning that it will honestly execute the pre-defined protocols, but attempt to learn as much private information as possible. In addition, we assume that the KGC and the users cannot collude together. Correctness. We say that a CLKS scheme is correct if, for all id ∈ I, mk output by the Setup, sk id output by the Gen-Private-Key, and pk id output by the GenPublic-Key, the following always holds:
Intuitively, the adversary model against CLKS consists of two kinds of adversaries similar to that of certificateless encryptions [13] : Type 1 adversary models the outsider, who is allowed to manipulate users' public key without accessing the KGC's master key mk; and Type 2 adversary models the insider, who can acquire the KGC's master key mk without manipulating users' public keys.
To be specific, we capture the two security requirements against the two adversaries via the following games. Let A be Type 1 adversary (Game A) or Type 2 adversary (Game B). The security games are played between A and the challenger, who maintains two lists:
-TokenList: It stores the tuple [id, kw], meaning that the search token with respect to the keyword kw for the user id has been queried by A. -UserInfoList: It stores the tuple [id, psk id , sk id , pk id , P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ], where the boolean value P 1 = 1 means that A has acquired psk id and P 1 = 0 not, the boolean value P 2 = 1 means that A has acquired sk id and P 2 = 0 not, and the boolean value P 3 = 1 means that A has replaced id's public key pk id and P 3 = 0 not.
The challenger runs Setup(1 ℓ ) to initialize the system parameter param and the master key mk. The challenger sends param to A, and sets two lists TokenList and UserInfoList empty. Phase 1: A is allowed to query the following oracles in polynomial many times. We use the bracket [·] to indicate the input to the oracle from A.
-Gen-Partial-Private-Key[id]: Given the user id from A, if psk id in UserInfoList is not null, then the challenger returns psk id . Otherwise, the challenger runs Gen-Partial-Private-Key(mk, id) to get psk id , adds [id, psk id , ⋆, ⋆, 1, 0, 0] to UserInfoList where ⋆ means null, and returns psk id to A. -Gen-Private-Key[id]: Given the user id from A, the oracle works as follows:
• If sk id in UserInfoList is not null, then the challenger retrieves sk id .
• Else if psk id in UserInfoList is not null, then the challenger retrieves psk id , runs sk id ←Gen-Private-Key(psk id ) and adds sk id to the UserInfoList.
• Otherwise, the challenger runs psk id ← Gen-Partial-Private-Key(mk, id) and sk id ←Gen-Private-Key(psk id ), and adds (id, psk id , sk id ) to UserInfoList. The challenger updates P 1 = 1 and P 2 = 1 in UserInfoList with respect to id and returns sk id to A.
-Gen-Public-Key[id]: Given the user id from A, the oracle works as follows:
• If pk id in UserInfoList is not null, then the challenger retrieves pk id .
• Else if sk id in UserInfoList is not null, then retrieve sk id , the challenger runs pk id ←Gen-Public-Key(sk id ) and adds pk id to the UserInfoList with respect to id.
• Else if psk id in UserInfoList is not null , then the challenger retrieves psk id , runs sk id ←Gen-Private-Key(psk id ) and pk id ←Gen-Public-Key(sk id , psk id ) and adds sk id , pk id to the UserInfoList with respect to id.
• Otherwise, the challenger runs psk id ← Gen-Partial-Private-Key(mk, id), sk id ←Gen-Private-Key(psk id ) and pk id ←Gen-Public-Key(sk id , psk id ), and adds (id, psk id , sk id , pk id , 0, 0, 0) to UserInfoList. The challenger returns pk id to A.
-Replace-Public-Key[id, pk] : Given the user id and the replaced public key pk from A (assume that pk id has been generated before), the challenger updates pk id in UserInfoList with pk, and sets P 3 = 1 with respect to id. -Gen-Token[id, kw] : Given the user id and the keyword kw from A, the challenger retrieves sk id from UserInfoList, runs Gen-Token(sk id , kw) to get token. The challenger adds [id, kw] to the TokenList and returns token to A.
Challenge Phase: A presents two keywords of the same length, kw 0 and kw 1 , and the user id * . Let [id * , psk id * , sk id * , pk id * , P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ] be the tuple stored in UserInfoList, we require that -P 1 = 0 and P 2 = 0, meaning that psk id * and sk id * are not acquired by A.
-Both (id * , kw 0 ) and (id * , kw 1 ) are not stored in TokenList. : Given the user id from A, the oracle works as follows:
• If sk id in UserInfoList is not null with respect to id, then retrieve sk id .
• Otherwise, run psk id ← Gen-Partial-Private-Key(mk, id) and sk id ←Gen-Private-Key(psk id ), and add (id, psk id , sk id ) to UserInfoList. The challenger updates P 1 = 1 and P 2 = 1 in UserInfoList with respect to id and returns psk id , sk id to A.
• If pk id in UserInfoList is not null with respect to id, then retrieve pk id .
• Else, the challenger runs psk id ← Gen-Partial-Private-Key(mk, id), sk id ←Gen-Private-Key(psk id ) and pk id ← Gen-Public-Key(sk id , psk id ), and add (id, psk id , sk id , pk id ) to UserInfoList. The challenger updates P 1 = 1 in UserInfoList and returns psk id , pk id to A.
-Gen-Token[id, kw] : Given the user id and the keyword kw from A, the challenger retrieves sk id from UserInfoList, runs Gen-Token(sk id , kw) to get token. The challenger adds [id, kw] to the TokenList and returns token to A.
Challenge Phase: A presents two keywords of the same length, kw 0 and kw 1 , and the user id * . Let [id * , psk id * , sk id * , pk id * , P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ] be the tuple stored in UserInfoList, we require that 
Main construction
High level idea Motivated by the DL assumption, we encrypt the keyword kw as follows: Let a, b, c be the private key (a, b, c R ← Z * p ) and g a , g b , g c be the public key, and set the keyword ciphertext as 
If kw = kw ′ , then the respective keyword ciphertext and search token should match:
This is because
On the other hand, we observe that the adversary can only acquire either KGC's master key (w.r.t Type 1 adversary) or the user's secret values (w.r.t Type 2 adversary with replaced public key), rather than both. This observation motivates use to expand the private key setting, such that KGC has the private key a, b, c and public key g a , g b , g c , and the user has the private key a
Therefore, the keyword ciphertext is constructed:
where H 1 is a hash function converting id to an element of G. Noting that we implicitly let the user id as part of the public key (cf. W 4 ), so that the ciphertext is associated to the user id. To this end, only knowing either a, c or a ′ , c ′ cannot infer any information about the ciphertext.
In order to generate search token, the user id, holding a ′ , c ′ , needs to acquire the term g ac . We achieve it based on the idea how the secret key was distributed in attribute-based encryption, where user id is treated as an attribute. That is, KGC generates the partial private key for the user id as
where t 1 R ← Z * p . Our construction We now show the CLKS construction as follows.
* → Z * p be a collision-resistant hash function and set the system parameter param = (e, G,
Given the user id, KGC proceeds as follows:
• The partial private key is set to psk id = (sk 1 , sk 2 ), which is sent to the user id via a secure channel. -Gen-Private-Key(psk id ): Given psk id , the user selects a ′ , c
Given sk id , the user sets its public key as pk = (pk 1 ,
The user encrypts the keyword kw and returns a ciphertext cph by selecting r 1 , r 2 R ← Z * p and setting cph = (W 1 , W 2 , W 3 , W 4 ) where
-Gen-Token(sk id , kw): The user id generates a search token token by selecting s R ← Z * p and setting token = (V 1 , V 2 , V 3 , V 4 ) where
Correctness. The correctness can be verified as follows:
,
Remark. Given a search token, the attacker can launch the off-line keyword guessing attack (aka. predicate privacy [25] ) because he can utilize the public information (e.g., public key) to test whether the given search token corresponds to some keyword. Such attack is inherent for certificate-based keyword search, identity-based (attribute-based) keyword search and our proposed CLKS. Some research efforts has been made to prevent such attack. For example, [24, 19, 31] considered the approaches where the search token can be transmitted over the public channel (i.e., search token indistinguishability) but the user needs to share some secret with the remote server, which cannot completely solve the off-line keyword guessing attack because the remote server can still launch this attack. The security of our proposed scheme can be assured by the following theorems, which proofs are shown in the Appendix. 
Performance Evaluation
We implemented the CLKS scheme in Java using the Java Pairing Based Cryptography Library [15] . In our implementation, we instantiated the bilinear map with Type A pairing (ℓ = 512) offering a level of security equivalent to 1024-bit Discrete Logarithm security. To process the keywords and the identities (both are strings), we used the SHA-1 to hash them into the 128-bit data, which are then transformed to the elements in Z * p and G respectively. To evaluate the feasibility of the CLKS in practice, we conducted the experiments with the real data, which is composed of 6,000 distinct keywords extracted from the ACM Digital Library. We ran the experiments on two machines: The user machine is a Windows 7 running laptop with Intel i5 2.60GHz CPU and 8GB RAM to simulate the user that runs the algorithm Enc; the server machine is a a Linux running desktop with Intel Core i7-2600 3.4GHz CPU and 4GB RAM to simulate the cloud server that runs the algorithm Match.
We ran six experiments using different number of keywords varying from 1000 to 6000 with step 1000. We repeated each experiment 5 times to determine the average execution time. Figure 2(a) compares the execution time for encrypting all keywords (on the user machine) and for finding the matched keyword ciphertexts with a given search token (on the server machine).
From Figure 2 (a) we see that encrypting entire keywords are more costly than finding the matched keyword ciphertexts. Fortunately, encrypting entire keywords will be executed only once, while finding matched ciphertext needs to be executed once per search request. Figure 2(b) shows the size of keyword ciphertexts that are serialized to the disk. We can see that the size of keyword ciphertexts is linear to the number of keywords. 
Conclusion
We have proposed a novel variant of keyword search -certificateless keyword search(CLKS), supporting keyword search on encrypted data while enjoying the benefits from certificateless cryptography. We presented a concrete construction, and proved its security under the DL assumption in the standard model. Proof. We prove this theorem with the game hopping technique [16] : Let S i denote the event of A winning the game i and Adv i be the advantage of A. Suppose game i + 1 proceeds the same as game i except for the case that game i + 1 will halt and output a random bit when a pre-defined event Ev happens. If Ev is detectable (i.e., Pr[Ev] is non-negligible) and Ev is independent from S i , then 
It also selects κ u ∈ {0, . . . , n} (note that id is n-bit number) and τ u ∈ {0, . . . , p} such that τ u (n + 1) < p.
-B selects x ′ u R ← Z τu and the vector (x u1 , . . . , x un ) where x uj ∈ Z τu , 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
-B selects y where Ω is the set of id queried to the oracle Gen-Partial-Private-Key, Ω ′ is the set of id queried to the oracle Gen-Private-Key, ξ eppk is the number of oracle queries to Gen-Partial-Private-Key and ξ prk is the number of oracle queries to Gen-Private-Key.
Therefore, if we set τ u = 2(ξ prk + ξ eppk ), then Pr[¬Ev 5 ] ≥ 
Proof of Theorem 2
The proof for this theorem uses similar technologies as in Theorem 1, hence we skip it here. Note that A will not query the oracle Gen-Partial-Private-Key because it has the master key.
